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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BECAUSE JACK DID NOT BUILD THIS HOUSE ALONE:
THE RIGHT TO THE MATRIMONIAL HOME
AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
Arundhati Katju
Introduction
Under Indian lay, when title to the matrimonial home is in the name of the husband, the wife has no
right of either ownership or possession over the home. Instead, she is only entitled to claim maintenance
against the husband. For housewives, this means that their labour in creating and maintaining the
matrimonial home goes unrecognised and has no economic value. The present legal regime ignores the
fact that the matrimonial home, as a form of property is valuable to the wife, both socially and

economicallyt
My primary argument in this paper is that women would have more concrete rights to the matrimonial
home if the right were recognised as one in property rather than one of a personal nature. Specifically,
this formulation will entitle a wife to the matrimonial home by virtue of her labour) Such a premise
raises a preliminary question as to the basis on which a right is dassified as a property right or a personal
right. If the basis of classification is itself linked to the exclusion of women from the property regime,
this requires reflection on the extent of gender discrimination inherent in the property regime. In this
regard, the secondary hypothesis put forward in this paper is that the core question of classification is
not gender neutral.
The scope of this paper extends to an introduction to the concept of the matrimonial home. While

enumerating the social and economic reasons why women need a right to the matrimonial horne, the
paper highlights why this need will not be met by substituting the home with a general right to residence
or shelter. In other words, the paper deals with why personal rights are less secure than property rights.
Finally, the paper attempts to substantiate the proposition that deprived of the use of property rights,
courts are forced to adopt circuitous methods to give women rights in the matrimonial home. Here the
doctrine of constructive trust is examined. In light of this, property rights are preferable, as they would

give women a direct and stronger claim to the matrimonial home.

* 111 Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) Student, National Law School of India Universiry I would like tn thank Mr. Sudhir
Krishnaswamy for his guidance in the writing of this paper. Ms. Geera Katju read earlier drafts and gave advice and encourageMCnr.
My argumeou is limited to a right to the matrmonial home and matrimonial property in general. I have not considered the
merits or demerits of wonens rights to property under various local and customary pre-colonial regimeS or the persona
laws (for example, the right to mrhr under the Muslim personal law) as arernatives to the soluion posited here. While such
argusnens do enrr merit, they must be placed in context of the evolution of the Hindu and the Uniform Civil Code de
bares, which are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion on women's right to property under the pre-colonial regimne and personnl laws, Me, FLAvA AGNs, LaW Aao GFNoni INEQUALITY IN INDIA (1999).
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The Concept of the Matrimonial Home in Indian Law and Society
For the purposes of this paper, the matrimonial home is taken to mean the house in which the couple
jointly reside for a period of time and which they have intended to be their place of residence.'
Under Indian law, a wife does not have a right to her matrimonial home if legal ownership of the
home is in the name of the husband. The Indian law follows the "separate property regime"
according to which spouses do not have a share in each other's property. This benefits the wife to the
limited extent that the husband cannot interfere with property which is in her name. However, where
both spouses jointly contribute to the property but one spouse holds title to it, the other spouse will
have no right to the property. Further, either spouse may disinherit the other by will?

Provision for Shelter - The Right to Maintenance and the Dwelling-house
In the absence of a right to matrimonial home, statutory provision for shelter for wives is made in
two ways. Firstly, there is a righf to maintenance which includes a provision for residence, and
secondly, under Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,s daughters have a right to the
dwelling-house under certain circumstances?

Under the English law, Section 30(7) of the Family Law Act, 1996 defines a "dwelling-house" as including (a) any building,
or part of a building which is occupied as a dwelling, or (b) any caravan, house-boat or structure occupied as a dwelling
and any yard, garden, garage or outhouse belonging to it and occupied with it. However Section 30(2) of the Act, which
details matrimonial horne rights, curtails [his wide definition. It requires both that the "dwelling-house" has actually been a
rnarimonal home of the couple and secondly that they have intended it to be their matrimonial home. In India the matrimonial home is not defined by statute or authoritatively by case law. Thus this paper broadly follows the definition of
"dwelling-house" given under the Family Law Act.
On the other hand, under a "community of property regime", each spouse acquires ownership of part of the property of
the other spousc regardless of how the property is nominally titled. This regime views marriage as an economic partnership. It has the advantage of giving the wife a share in her husband's properry, but it must be kept in mind that in pntice
the husband will often administer the property alone. To incorporate the advantages of both approaches, the "deferred
community" system has been suggested. During the subsistence of the marriage, the property is treated as separate propertr, while at the time of divorce the principle of community of property applies. Thus each spouse has the right to administer her/his own property, with safeguards being provided against, for example, fraudulent alienation, See, B.
SiVARAMAYYA, MATImIiNAt. PROPERTY LAtw IN INDIA Xiv, 2-17 (1999) and Marjorie Berman, Aarnied Wamen'r Prmperty Rht, in
JuSTicE FOR WOMEN. PERSONAL LAWS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND LAw REFORM 237 (Tnrdrajaising ed., 1996).

Section 3(1)(b)(i), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 states that "Maintenance includes - in all cases, provision
for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment."
Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act states: "Special provision respecting dwelling-houses: Where a Hindu intestate has
left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in class I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a
dwelling-house wholly occupied by members of his or her family, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the
right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling-house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide
their respective shares therein; but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein:
PROVIDED that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling-house
only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow."
In general, daughters do not inherit equally with sons under the Hindu Succession Act, or under Muslim law. However, under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, Christian and Parsi daughters share equally with sons. The position under Hindu law
is particularly bad because women do not share in the joint family system. Even in states where unmarried daughters have
been recognised as cparceners (Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka) this has the collateral disadvantage of cutting into the wife's share upon inheritance because the husband's share in the joint family property has decreased See, BINA AGAWRAL, GENDER AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN L;ANDEDo
PROPERTY IN INDIA (1999).
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The right to the matrimonial home is inadequate because under the current regime it can only be
derived from the right to maintenance. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, defines
"maintenrance" as including provision for residence. The structure of the Act thus forces the Judiciary
to adopt a circuitous route to rule with respect to property. In Shanta Wadwa v. Purshottam Wladbwa,
die Bombay High Court held that it could adjudicate upon the matrimonial home because residence
was part of "maintenance" under Section 3(l)(b)(i), Hindu Adopions and Maintenance Act. This
reasoning is weak because it confuses the right to the matimonial home with the right to
maintenance. These are two different rights and must be kept apart conceptually. The right to
maintenance is qidproque for the right of consortium that the husband exercises over the wife.' The
ight to the matrimomial home should be a property right arising from the wife's labour in the home.
As the right to shelter under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act arises out of the personal
right of maintenance, the courts harbour the misconception that an increased provision for
maintenance can compensate for the loss of the matrimonial home. For example, in Banse Lal
Darawila v. Jal C Darumwla9 the court increased the wife's maintenance in lieu of the home, which
the husband retained in his possession."' Similarly, in in the Matter of BHP & V Lt, V/isakhqiwpanm,"
an employee of a government-owned company was living with his wife in company quarters. He
started living apart from the wife, while she continued to live in the matrimonial home. He then
terminated his lease with the company, after which the company demanded that the wife vacate the
house. The District Court passed an injunction against the company and the husband from evicting
her. This was upheld by the High Court, but the High Court also ordered that the rent paid by the
husband to the company would be deducted from the maintenance payable to her. In both these
cases, the courts looked upon the right to the matrimonial home as a subset of the right to
maintenance instead of a separate right. As a consequence, the court considered it logical that if the
monetary provision for shelter were increased, other provisions for maintenance should be decreased
or ner rrsa. Instead, if the rights to the matrimonial home and maintenance are kept distinct, then
rent would not be deducted from maintenance."

The Inadequacy of "Rights, Control and Access" to the Matrimonial Home
The effectiveness of the right to the matrimonial home as it currently stands may be evaluated against
the three-pronged "rights, control and access" rest propounded by Bina Agarwal"The test recognises
that the property advantage does not stern from ownership rights alone. Rather, it must be
accompanied by control over and access to landed property. This section examines each element of
the test and how well it is met by the current state of the right to the matrimonial home.

(1977) MAr. L

J. 661.

On

this

basis the Bombay High Court issued an injunction preventing the husband from entering

the marrirnonial home.
PArus DirAN, FAutiy Law 603 (1998). (Hereinafter "DwAN'.
AlIt 1964 Bom. 124.
It must be noted that an increased provision for maintenance may not be sufficient to provide residence of the standard to
which the wife is accustomed.
AIR 1985 A.P 207.
'

One solution to this is to calcuate the amount of mrenance keeping in mind the amount required for rent. Howeer,
is was not done in the Instat case.

o BrA AnAn'w.,

A Fimn or ONmi's Ow, 19 (1994). (Heremiafter "AGAwAiCO.
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Control refers to the physical control of property, regardless of title to the property. Control of
property is often in the hands of men, as a gender, even when the property is under state or
community ownership 4 The importance of control over property is emphasised in the case of B.R.
Mebta v. Atma Dedi Here the husband and wife were living separately when the husband's landlord
brought an eviction suit against him Under Section 14(1) proviso (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958, in the event that the tenant had built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a
residence, he could be evicted. The landlord claimed that the husband should be evicted because he
had an alternative accommodation available, namely, a house that had been allotted to the wife.
Though the husband and wife were separated, the wife returned at times to live with the husband and
at the time of the filing of the suit they were residing together. The court held that, as the wife was
the legal owner of the separate residence, the husband had no right to stay in the wife's house and
could be evicted by her at any time. Since the husband did not have domain over the wifes flat, the
court allowed him to retain possession of the flat against the landlord. Unfortunately, it is the
exception rather than the rule-that the wife has control and not the husband. A study by Flavia Agnes
of women filing for maintenance reveals that ninety percent of them had to leave the house.1 6 Of the
women who remained in the matrimonial home, only half got exclusive possession. Women were nor
given possession even though they were still legally married. On the issue of control, it is observed
that once the wife has left the home, courts are reluctant to restore her right to reside in the
matrimonial home, while if she is in the home, it is relatively easy to get a protection order restraining
the husband from dispossessing her)
The second element of the test, access, refers to the ability to use property. Access can be through
customary rights of ownership and use, or through concessions granted by individuals to kin or
friends) Access can allow the use of property even though there are no legal rights therein.
A study of case law reveals that courts curtail the access to the home. In Pakbiraj]Jainv. NasnaJain,"
the wife forcibly entered the home after being evicted by her husband. The court found the wife
guilty of trespass, because she had no legal ide to the home. They reasoned that, if they held the
other way, the door would be open to third parties as well, to trespass on the land. Sirrilarly, in Abdur
Rabie v. Padea,21 upon takq from her husband, the wife contended that the matrimonial home was

The ownership mode allows control of the hore to remain with men as a gender. This enables owners to use property as
they wish by virtue of having title. Government incursions on the freedom to use property are seen as requiring affirmadve
juntification. Further, once tide has been vested in one person, transferring the property to others as affirmadve action is
seen as antithetical to die "logic" of propeny law. SeearaiJosaaWitntv SiGERn, PIOper, inTHE- PoneCs oF LAw: A
Paorunssiver CarnTuQ240 (David Kaitys ed., 199B). (Hereinafter "SINGER').
(1987) 4 SCC. 183.
FuwiA
",

AGNEs,

GivE Us Tims DAY OuR DAIY BRArD:

PRoCEuurs

AND CASE LRA&

ON MANIEWNANCE 125

(1992).

"

Id

"

bid at 96, 124. It has been suggested that a wife lving in the matrimonial horne should be in the same position as any other
peaceful occupant of property Under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, such occupants are protected against
forcible dispossession even though they do nor have tide. FREDDY FAii, IlYmwn?' Righ in the Maiwonial Home, in Junc
won Woas-N PERSONA. Lsvs, Won's Ricets AND LAw Rm 244 (ndirajaising ed., 1996). (iereinfrer "'Fan)
AGARwa., sopr note 13, at 13.
Appea from Order no, 1003 of 1986, Der- 1986, Bombay
A.IR. 1982 Born. 341.
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secured out of their joint contribution and that she was entitled to reside in the house both as wife
and joint owner. The court held that the wife did not have a specific right against her husband to be
provided a paricular house, or a right to live in any par of the house. The house was partitoned with
the wife getting a one-third share. The court passed an injunction prohibiting her from entering the
rest of the house subject to the conditon that the husband paid her Rs. 1000 per month as
maintenance. While the judgement is progressive in that it provides the wife both residence and
maintenance, the wife's right to the home is a right against the husband rather than a right to the
home- Thus her physical access to the home is curtailed
The third element of the test is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the legal right? As previously
mentioned, the current structure of the rights to residence substitute the right to the matrimonial
home with a right to the dwelling-house under Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act. Applying
Agarwal's test to Section 23, we see that the rights, control and access are afl limited, The section

provides that the right is available to only those daughters who are for practical purposes
"husbandless", that is, unmarried, deserted, separated, divorced or widowed. The situations covered
in this section do not provide for a married daughter who is facing harassment or domestic violence,

where the spouses are not separated." Access is blocked as the daughter may reside in the house only
if it is occupied wholly by the family of the intestate. If the house has been tenanted the daughter has

no right to residence. Control of the house is restricted as the daughter may not herself demand
partition of the house.
In light of the above, though there are several ways by which a woman may have access to land,
having "rights" is the most secure. Thus a secure right to land must come along with control and
access. The property right to the matrimonial home best satisfies the three pronged test of rights,
control and access. Provisions made in the form of the dwelling house and "residence" are
insufficient as far as satisfaction of this test is concerned. Given this, it is evident that for a wife, the
right to the matrimonial home is more effective than the right to maintenance or the right to the
dwelling-house However, even if women were given absolute rights in the dwelling-house, this would
not solve the problem of them not being the owners of the property that they create through their
labour. Therefore, in the absence of a right to the matrimonial propery, the current legal regime does
not satisfactorily provide shelter to the wife.

The Socio-econon-ic Significance of the Matrimonial Home
Women should have a right to the matrimonial home because, regardless of nominal titling, the
matrimonial home is created by the joint labour of both spouses. Women contribute to the home
through child-rearing and domestic labour. These should be considered as contributions to the
acquisition of the property? Non-recogniidon of a right to the matrimonial home results in a scenario
where the women's labour in the home is relegated to the private sphere, outside of the public space
that property occupies. Engels, recognised this when he wrote that with the emergence of the
patriarchal family, "(t)he administration of the household lost its public character. It became apiiamte

Acrniaw.

apma note 13, at 13.

DmAru,
'&. sq

note

8, at 16

Paojiaha, Gewnin4 of Praert Rome A Califor Miwa-idRght, 1 NLSJJ 155 (1993) at 157
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sertice. The wife became the first domestic servant, pushed out of participation in social
production

'2s

Engels' solution for the invisibility of women's labour was to encourage women to take employment
outside the home,' but this stems from his understanding that capitalism is the source of patriarchy
However, women's economic and social needs require rights- iri kanded property rather than a mere
increase in employment.
The second reason why women need a right to the matrimonial home stems from the need for
shelter. However, this is a need specific to the matrimonial home and not for residence generally.
This is by virtue of the fact that property has cultural value, over and above its worth as secunrty or its
market value. Property could have symbolic meanings which make it important. For example,
ancestral land may have ritual importance or stand for ties of continuity and kinship.27
As a form of property; the matrimonial home may have economic and social value due to which it
cannot be substituted by a general right to residence. The matrimonial home does not merely serve as
a shelter for the wife but is also linked to social standing, physical security and class. In certain
situations, such as those of domestic violence, women are often isolated from their maternal families
and do not have any other shelter available. Then the matrimonial home becomes vital as the only
shelter available to them." Further, a woman without a husband is vulnerable to harassment and it
would be beneficial if she could continue to reside in a locality which she is familiar with and in which
she has a support structure. The size of the house and its geographical location are also important
factors. Given the fall in economic security which women experience upon divorce or separation, it is
important to provide stability by giving them rights to the house in which they resided in the course
of their marriage. Having to establish a new home would be an additional burden. This problem is
exacerbated in urban centres where there is a shortage of decent housing, and travel is difficult.
Thus, the matrimonial home has socio-economic significance in itself It cannot therefore be
substituted by a general right to residence. The following section argues that women also have a right
to the matrimonial home specifically because of their labours in the home.

ENGous, THE OuGiN oFTrE FAMLY, PRIvATE PRoraY AND Ti STATE (1884), re5Hnkdin GENDER ViOEWCE
PRjaic
sa
INTERDOIQPUNARY PERSPFc'nves 11, 18 (Laura C. Toole andJessica R. Schiffean, eds., 1997).

a

Id.

SAARWAL, ,Mper

note 13,

at 18,

a The proposed Domestic Violence Bill drafted by Lawyer's Collective, New Delhi made provision for orders preventing the
husband tram residing in the same house in cases of severe domestic violence, and also to reinstate women in the "shared
household" (a term broader than "rnarimooni home", encompassing wives, mothers, sisters and other female
dependarnts). See, Jayna Kotibari, Damerhc Vlokn: The Needfor a New Law? THE LrvRygni's CoLucnvr 25 (2000). This was
amended and introduced in the Lok Sabba by the governmenr in The form of the "The Protection From Domestic Violence Bill, 2001'. However this Bill was critiised on various counts, en/er alia, for replacing provisions relating to the remova of the abusive spouse from the household aad restoration of the house to the battered woman, with a more general, coathiess provision enablng the court to "pass any other direcuons as may be considered necessary". Indira Jaising,
Safeipr...Amift thir bill TH IINau, December 15,2002,
wwsw.hindonoment.cnmLhehiddrilmsa/2002/12,/i5/storic/2002121,50047010.hrm (visited on July 4, 2003).
"

Seegnebral,

FARM, supre note 18.
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Conceptual Debates

Rethinking the Purpose of Property in Law

-

The question relating to -when a right is a property right is of considerable importance. The labelling
of a thing as "property" allows it entry into the state's property regime- a realm of taxation, a market
and a legal system. Through the recording and regulation of ownership and possession of property,
the state controls politically, economically and socially vital resources. The property regime offers
various benefits such as possessory remedies and rules of access and exclusion The supremacy of
property rights over personal rights in the rights hierarchy stems from the needs of the market.
Property rights must be protected because the market cannot function without predictability and
certainty of ride.'
At the same time, not all rights are included widin the property regime and therefore certain people
are excluded from these benefits. When a woman's right to the matrimonial home is not recognised as

property but is instead thought of merely as an extension of the right to maintenance, women are
excluded at the very outset from the property regime and the benefits that it grants.
While dealing with the issue of classification of a right as a personal or property right, the central
question to be answered is when the right to a thing may be considered a property right. Different
answers are offered by P J. Fitzgerald's edition of Salmond on juiprudened' and by J. E. Penner in The

Idea of Properovin Lan
According to Fitzgerald, property consists of a number of rights to a thing (such as shenation,
exclusion, and ownership). The bundle together constitutes property even though all the rights need
not be present simultaneously for the rght to be a property eight. He offers three pssible answers
to the question as to when the right to a thing is a property right.
Firstly, Fitzgerald says that proprietary rightsM have monetary worth while personal rights do noLtt
But this distinction depends on whether society considers it ethically permissible or scientifically
possible to trade in that item rather than whether it has monetary value or not. Thus, when body
organsa or DNA are kept out of the marker, the decision turns on questions of ethics rather than
on whether the goods have any market value.
Secondly, Fitzgerald notes that both rights in rem and in pemronam can be proprietary rights.' He
clarifies that the law of property is the law of proprietary rights in rm, while proprietary rights in
personam form the subject matter of the law of obligations, such as debts and contracts. However,
Her - Wbta Woano Can Say Aho
Sujars or LA% 87 (1996). (1-lereinfter "GaEnN").
KATE GREEN, Bi

P. J. Prnracuo, SAuLoNo

INJUiSPRuOENcE (12h

J. E&PENuR, ThE. haLk OF PosiRY irn

Land Laq in

ed., 1966). (Hereinafter "SAtMOND).

ALw
(1997).

(Hereinafter "PENNERf).

SAULONO, rpranote 31, at 246.
'

is, rights which
SABuoNo, sipra note
Thani

form

the subject-matrer of a persods estate.

31,, at 239.

Transplntation of Huinan Organs Act, 1994.
Moore v Rgmtt f the Uiimiy of Carnw 793 P.2d 479 (CaL 1990).
Sau-ioNo, Lupra note 31, at 239.
3

SAMoNs,

2

spro nore 31, a 41

FaMhNISTPIRPCTIViS ON 1t1JtFOUNDAToNM,

.
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whether a right is enforceable in rem or inpersonar is a consequence of the right being a property or
personal right and not the reason why it is classified as such.
Finally, he distinguishes between rights in rem and rights inpersonam on the basis of the origin of the
right. Rights in rem are rights in respect of something while rights in personam are rights against a
person. However, he acknowledges that as every right involves both a real and a personal relation, the
deciding factor is which of the two lies at the forefront of juridical conception." This is determined
on two grounds. Firstly, the right in rem is a relation between the owner and the world at large, while
the right in personam is a definite relation between determinate individuals. Secondly, rights in rm and
in personam depend on the character of the real or personal relation, respectively. A right in rent is
conferred because the holder stands in some special relation to the thing which is the object of the
right, for example because the owner made it or found it. A right inpersonamarises because the holder
stands in some special relation to the person who is the subject of the correlative duty, for example, a
right against the opposite party to a contract.4'
Fitzgerald's work leaves the right to the matrimonial home open to classification as either a personal
or a property right. Given that labour gives rise to ownership rights in the property so created, if the
wife is considered to have "made" the matrimonial home through her labour, she has, arguably, a right
in rem. Yet the right to maintenance "lies at the forefront of juridical conception". If the right to the
matrimonial home is grounded in the right to maintenance, it emerges as a personal right linked to the
status of the parties.
Thus, though Fitzgerald offers three possible answers to the question of when a right is a property
right none of them are satisfactory, It is here thatJ. E. Penner's exposition of the "separability thesis"
in The Idea of Property in Law might provide a solution. Penner sums up his idea in the following
manner: "Only those 'things' in the world which are contingently associated with any particular owner
may be objects of property; as a function of the nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of
normative consequence beyond the fact that ownership has changed occurs when an object of
property is alienated to another."
Thus, for a thing to be property, it must exist conceptually separate from the owner; and could belong
just as well to somebody else. Whether or not this separation is possible depends on the character of
the thing as "personality rich or poor". To determine this, Penner poses a question - does a different
person who takes on the relationship stand in the same position as the first?" In the case of personal
rights, "(t)he objects of (personal rights) are not just in the real world but exist as a result of personal
dealings between the two parties, and it is natural not to think of either of the parties to such special
relationships as substitutable by other people per se." So when the right is personality rich, and the
parties are in a special relationship and cannot be substituted for others, the right is a personal right. As
a corollary, when the parties can be substituted, the right is personality poor and thus a property right.

SALmoND, supm note 31, at 237.
SALMONo,

wpro note 31,

PENNER,.spra note

at 237-238.

32, at 111.

RENNER, sra note 32, at 115.
P
PFNNER, sr4ra note 32, at 115.
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In this framework, the right to the matrimonial home can be classified as a property right. Admittedly
marriage is an element of a person's status and the right to the matrimonial home arises after the
marriage. But substitutability is the more relevant determinant in the classification of the right. The
pertinent question is whether there are factors affecting the right which would not be found in another
person similarly situated. The prosaic answer is that any other married person would have been able to
create the property. There is no personal quality involved in the creation of the property that binds the
husband/wife to the property. While the matrimonial relationship hinges on the status and personal
qualities of the parties, the creation of the property is simply a matter of having put in labour. Using
Penner's separability thesis, then, the right to the matrimonial home can be classified as a property tight.
To be fair, Fitzgerald seems to be making substantively the same point as Penner when he says that the
holder of a right in rem stands in a "special relation"' to the object of the right. Penner is able to ask a
more specific question because the nature of his enquiry pertains directly to the question at hand.
However, to his credit, Penner removes the relation between persons from his grounds of classification
and instead reduces the equation to that between the person and the thing. His single-point test leaves
no scope for classification of the right to the matrimonial home as a personal right. The argument that
the right to the home arises essentially from the right to consortium is no longer of any consequence.
Instead, focus shifts to the wife's labour and whether this makes the home "personality poor".
The broader point to be made here, however, is that the seemingly neutral question of which rights
are personal rights and which are property, itself carries gendered implications. This contradicts the
idea of property law as an impartial set of rules, deciding conflicts as per the dictates of disinterested
logic. Property law presents itself as "a mere abstract play of interests (in) a war-game for
minds.. Reason is seen to demand that the needs of property owners, self-interested and rational
individuals in the market place, override the needs of those who are different: weaker or poorer, or in
a different way defined as the Other".' What is seen instead is that both the nature of the question
asked and the answer submitted in reply exclude certain rights while admitting others, and this seems
to work independent of the subject matter of the right Power and exclusion seem to be the
overriding rationale, rather than cold reason or logic.
The Idea of Constructive Trust as a Personal Rights Solution
The earlier section paints a dismal picture of women's chances of accessing the matrimonial home
through the property rights regime. Changing social mores have, however, forced courts to recognise
the wife's claim to the matrimonial home. Common law has managed to find conceptual instruments
like the doctrine of constructive trust to circumvent the husband's rights of ownership. However,
these still leave the wife in a weak position because her right is personal and not as strong as the
husband's property right.
English law developed the complicated instrument of the family home as a constructive trust to give
the wife a right to the matrimonial home. Under the English law the wife had the right of occupation
of the matrimonial home, which was rooted in the common law rights of consortium and
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maintenance. The right of occupation could be primarily discharged by the husband providing the
wife a home for residence.
Since ordinary rules of property applied to matrimonial property, legal
title determined ownership of the home. Coupled with the doctdne of separation of property, this
implied that unless the wife could establish equitable ownership she would have no right to the
home. The court therefore found a partial soluton by seeing the fanily home as a construcnve trust.
The husband was deemed to hold the home in trust for the wife, who had a beneficial interest in the
home. This solution was inadequate because the doctrine merely offered the wife a beneficial interest
in the matrimonial home but did not overcome the husband's right of ownership.
In Hise v. hne," the question arose as to whether Section 17 of the Married Women's Right to
Property Act, 1882," which provided that a judge could pass any order he deemed fit in a summary
application regarding title or possession of the property, could be used to reallocate property rights in
the matrimonial home. Lord Denning ruled that family property had to be treated differently from
other forms of property with respect to the primacy of title. Lord Denning's judgement implied that
the provision was not merely procedural in nature but in fact conferred a substantive power upon the
judge to reallocate property rights between the parties. He then used this interpretation to hold that
if the wife had made a substantial contribution to the overall household expenses, she would have a
beneficial interest in the home. This was regardless of how the money had been used and whether
nominal title was in the husband's name.
This view was struck down in the subsequent cases of Peftit v. Peni' and Giing v. Gsing 2 which
conclusively esablished the view that family property was not to be treated differently and ordinary
principles of property were to apply thereto. in order to bypass the husband's title, the House of
Lords applied the doctrine of constructive trust. Lord Reid held that when there is no agreement
between the partners to share family property, nothing less than part payment of the price of the
home will entitle a spouse to a proprietary interest However, the court held that it could impure to
the parties the common intention of "reasonable people in their shoes"Mwith regard to the sharing
of property because the couple would not have contemplated the dissolution of the marriage at the
rime of acquiring the asset. The court held that the requisite common intention could be inferred
from the conduct of the parties.'
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However, a mere "expenditure for the benefit of the family" does not suffice to show this intention."
The non-owning spouse has to do some act to facilitate acquisition of the beneficial interest. This
translates into a "matenial sacrifice by way of contrtbution to or economy in general family
expendimure'? But effctively such a sacrifice must also be made with the intention of acquiring the
beneficial interest. Thus, it is insufficient if the spouse merely makes a contribution to the day-to-day
expenditures in the running of the household. Over and above this, there must be an intention that
such sacrifices enable the partner to acquire an interest in the house.
Improvements to the horne do not create an entitlement, much less payment of household bills or
monies saved through good housekeeping? Only improvements to the home which are of a capital
or non-recurring nature will create a beneficial interest in the home.?'
The current position as regards the beneficial trust is found in LIogd'r Bank pe v. Rosset.P This case
outlined two tests by which the trust would be established, depending on whether or not there was an
express agreement to share the property.
The first test applies to situations where there is an express agreement to share the property. If on
the basis of the agreement, the non-owning spouse made a detrimental reliance, the trust is
established.' Detrimental reliance is work on which "the woman could not reasonably have been
expected to embark on unless she was to have an interest in the property" 6' Lkbyd cites the examples
of Eves v. Ewes,<where the woman had done hard manual labour in the house, and Grantv. Edwards,
where the plaintiff could pay the mortgage because the woman went to work and her earnings were
applied to household expenditures. However, Lord Bridge notes that even in these cases, the conduct
of the female partners fell far short of such conduct as would have supported their claims, and that
they were saved only by the presence of an express agreement.'
The second Loyl test applies where there is no express agreement. In such a case, the court may
infer a common intention to share the property from the conduct of the parties. But here the
minimum standard required to establish this common intention is a direct contribution to the
purchase price or to the mortgage instalments.
The obvious disadvantage of the constructive trust doctrine is that neither through Gissing nor the

two Lod's tests do the ordinary contributions of the wife give her ownership rights to the home.
Under the former, when she does housework, both parties must intend that she is to acquire a
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beneficial interest through the same. In Lloyd' first test, the work done to improve the property must
be over and above the regular housework which the partner would normally undertake. So women are
'expected" to do some housework, but this does not give them a share in the home. If the wife is a
professional interior decorator, and she decorates her house with as much skill and time as she would
put in professionally, there is, arguably, a "detrimental reliance" which would give her a share in the
home. But die case of detrimental reliance would not be satisfied if she was merely a housewife who
has taken some trouble in decorating her house. As for the second LDfs test, in the absence of a
payment towards the mortgage or the purchase price of the house, it would not apply at all,
irrespective of a strong implied agreement.
Thus, as per this doctrine, the wife has no rights to the property merely by virtue of the housework
brings this inequity into sharp
and care she provides. The subsequent decision of Burns v. Buridn
focus. In this case, the couple were unmarried but had lived together for seventeen years and had two
children together. The plaintiff was known as Mrs. Burns and had made a statutory declaration of
change of name. She had made no direct contribution to the purchase price or mortgage payments
on the house, but had worked for five years and used her income to contribute fixtures and fittings in
the house. She received an allowance from Mr. Burns. It was held that no proof could be found of
an intention to create a beneficial interest, and therefore she had no right to the home."
The constructive trust doctrine was a well-meaning attempt to create rights in the home for the wife
while still protecting the husband's property right. However the wife starts on a lower footing
because in spite of her labour in the home her interest remains a beneficial interest and not a
property right. The formulation therefore relies on the intention of the husband to limit his right in
favour of the wife. The coure's do not recognise the contribution of the wife direrdy through her
labour. Even if the court were to formulate a new test which takes into consideration the labour of
the wife, this would still have to contend with the primacy of the husband's title. The only way to
challenge this is to recognise that the wife's labour creates a property right thereto and not merely a
beneficial interest in the home.

Conclusion
The importance of the matrimonial home demands that women have a right in the home by virtue of
their monetary or labour contribution to its everyday functioning. Within the current regime, the law
can at best strengthen the wifes position with instruments such as the idea of constructive trust.
However, property rights enjoy a privileged position in the rights regime compared to personal rights.
The wife should be entitled to a property right to the matrimonial home and should not have to settle
for alternative remedies in the form of personal rights.
Even though a conceptual basis is available to enable this paradigm shift, the law still labels the wife's
right as a personal right and ranks it lower than the husband's property right. The simple ownership
model of propetry considers property rights inviolable, but ignores the fact that property rights have
social and moral costs, and that the exercise of property rights by one person affects others.

*

[1984]1 AMELR. 244.
This
n' paper has nor gone into rhe righn of unmarried parner. However, the case of Cmheld thai the rules of he beneficial trust would apply equaly to a mistress as to a wife

35

Ha ad [1972

1 WLR. -518,

VOL 15

Studeit Bar Resew

2003
2

Unfortunately, under the neo-liberal regime, the role of law is not to ensure a fair distribution of
property but rather to meet the needs of the market. The primacy accorded to title results in the
adoption of circuitous methods to give the wife rights to the home She must be brought in through
the back door because the "logic" of propery still guards the front entrance; only those rights which
can be classified as property rights will be conferred the benefits of the property regime. So a system
of property where the right turns on the origin of the property rather than the object of the right,
can easily dismiss any interest the wife rosy have in the house by virtue of her labour on the ground
that the right originates in the status of the parties. Instead if the determinant is the object of the
right, the wife wdi have a right to the property by virtue of her labour contribution to the house.
The law should acknowledge that property is a source of power economic, political, social and
cultural - and simultaneously commit the property regime to an ethical dictum; because property is
valuable, "(we) want everyone .. to have some'" Since "property" is not an ideal that exists
independently of social relations, the content of property law can only be decided once society makes
its value-judgments about the appropriate contours of social relationships." It is not enough to have
regimes that do not prima faci discriminate on the basis of gender. If these nevertheless perpetuate
gender inequality, then it is evident that there are structural problems in our understanding of
property which must be addressed.
There is also a broader point to be made about the role of property in personal laws. While property
is the currency of the laws of inheritance and succession, matrimonial laws seem to evade such
scrutiny. " Matrimonial laws are about relatonships and not about economically important things like
property, so one could be taught matrimonial law without any understanding of or references to
property or trust. Clearly the link between these two fields does not have to be made in the
classroom. The status that personal laws have acquired as "soft laws" is problematic in both legal
teaching and practice; but the absence of property-based analysis reflects a larger problem with legal
teaching. There is a general failure or perhaps an inability to strike at the heart of a statute, to move
beyond the "Objects and Reasons" to the sub ject matter it actually acts upon. Yet, understanding that
family law regulates women's right to property gives one a better understanding of the impact of
family law on the lives the people it purports to regulate.
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